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It was already clear to Seneca, almost 2000 years ago, that “[i]f a man knows not to
which port he sails, no wind is favourable”.
Now, almost 2000 years later, as mentioned by Armin von Bogdandy in his inspiring
introduction to this symposium, we are faced with a crucial question of existential
significance: Are we moving towards a Europeanised Germany or a Germanised
Europe?
In order to answer to the question, we have to draw a distinction between intention
and practical effect.
The goal of creating a Europeanised Germany is endorsed by (amongst others)
most German academics, alongside also judges and politicians. However, the
practical effect, especially of some rulings of the German Federal Constitutional
Court, is to move towards a Germanised Europe, and with it the amplification of the
existing German legal hegemony. The implications of this further rise in German
dominance are highly problematic. And a particularly difficult issue is the risk of
“manipulative” borrowing by the most illiberal legal systems in Central and Eastern
Europe, including first and foremost by Poland and Hungary.
Let us consider another revealing example of the mismatch between intention
and practical effect as regards the tension between a Germanised Europe
and Europeanised Germany.  One of the original aims underlying the idea of
German legal hegemony might be, in the words of Schmitt (as quoted by Armin
von Bogdandy), to protect against interference that “secret crypt in which the spirit
of European jurisprudence takes root”. However, here too, the practical effect of
growing legal hegemony might be diametrically opposed to this.
Let us consider, for instance, the impact of the (in)famous decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court on the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP).
As Sabino Cassese rightly points out, this ruling may be viewed as an attempt to
rein in the European institutions with a German leash. However, as the former Italian
constitutional judge goes on to emphasise later on in the same editorial, one of
the practical effects of the ruling was to attract harsh criticism in western Europe
(including in Frankfurt and Luxembourg), whilst being warmly welcomed by the
Hungarian and Polish Governments. These governments interpreted the ruling (and
in this respect the thin line between interpretation and manipulation has never been
quite so thin) as providing further justification for aggressively sceptical approach
towards the process of European Union integration.
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In other words, once again, there is a mismatch between intent and effects.
Whilst the intention behind the ruling may have been to create, as Cassese points
out, “a German dog leash for the European institutions”, there is a risk that the effect
will be exactly the opposite: to “unleash” the most populist and illiberal tendencies
within the weakest democracies in the European Union.
In other words, the PSPP judgment of the Karlsruhe Court has been, not
unexpectedly, exploited and manipulated in Budapest and Warsaw in order to further
expand their populist narrative.
This is a risk inherent within the judicial migration of constitutional ideas from west
to east. Moreover, it is not the first time it has manifested itself. The “identity test”
case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court, from the Lisbon Urteil to the
OMT rulings, offers a perfect case study for examining manipulative borrowing within
comparative constitutional adjudication.
Leaving aside the clear responsibility of “manipulative borrowers” from Hungary
and Poland, another form of responsibility has to be shouldered by the German
Federal Constitutional Court: despite its best intentions, this Court risks taking on the
uncomfortable role of a Bad Master.
In other words, can it be argued that, as the de facto judicial hegemon in Europe, the
German Federal Constitutional Court is under a special responsibility to avoid a risk
of manipulative borrowing?
I suggest that metaphoric language can help us to answer this question. This is
because metaphors have a constitutive value not only in language itself but also in
legal reasoning. They help us to make conceptual shifts from a familiar prototype to
a less familiar manifestation of that prototype. The mechanism by which this occurs
is the migration (and manipulation) of constitutional ideas from west to the east.
Metaphorical language offers a particularly powerful tool for examining this dynamic
because the metaphor itself incorporates the very concept of migration. This is so
both ontologically and etymologically. More specifically, the notion of meta-pherein,
or carrying “beyond” through different fields of experience, implies a process of
carrying over or transferring knowledge across domains. For this reason, every
metaphor has a source domain and a target domain, so as to enable the migration of
a conceptual prototype from its natural (familiar) source domain to another unfamiliar
target domain.
Against this backdrop, I propose competition law as the source domain and
European constitutional law as the target domain. As such, I propose that we frame
the approach taken by the German Federal Constitutional Court as the abuse of
a judicial dominant position within the marketplace of constitutional ideas in
Europe.
It is clear that the metaphor suggested here is inspired by the legendary “free
marketplace of ideas” proposed for the first time by US Supreme Court Justice Oliver
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Wendell Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Abrams1)Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919)..
The source domain for Holmes’ metaphor is economic competition, embodied by
a free marketplace of competing traders, whilst its target domain is the protection
of pluralism in relation to freedom of speech. For our present purposes, antitrust
law, and the parallelism inferred with European constitutional law, offers a powerful
account – through the metaphor of the existence (or abuse) of a dominant position
by the German Federal Constitutional Court within the “European market of
constitutional ideas” – of how the concept of constitutional identity has been used
and abused. In doing so, it reveals the wider effect of self-centred arguments based
on constitutional patriotism.
In order to enable the metaphor proposed to be better understood, it is essential
to start from the source domain of the metaphor, that is the antitrust concept of a
dominant position and the abuse of a dominant position, as interpreted within the
case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). As early as 1979,2)Court of Justice
of the EU, 13 February 1979, 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission
of the European Communities. the ECJ defined a dominant position as “a position of
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective
competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and
ultimately of the consumers”. As regards on the other hand the concept of abuse, the
Court specified in the judgment that the concept of abuse is an objective notion, and
that an abuse may be committed by any conduct by the dominant undertaking that
is liable to influence the structure of the market. The intention of the undertaking
is not relevant for the purposes of establishing whether or not an abuse has
occurred, but rather only the effect, that is the objective impact on the structure
of the market. This is very important as far as our target domain is concerned, in the
light of the bifurcation mentioned above between intention and practical effect. Only
the effect is relevant.
The ECJ has also held3)Court of Justice of the EU, 9 November 1983, 322/81, NV
Nederlandsche. that a dominant position does not in itself represent a problem for
competition law purposes but that, due to the ability to exert an influence on the
structure of the market, it subjects undertakings that are in a dominant position to
a special responsibility, which is not by contrast imposed on others, and where this
responsibility is not heeded an abuse will be committed.
If we now turn to the process of migration, which – as mentioned above – is inherent
to the constitutive nature of the metaphor, namely a shift or transfer from a source
domain to a target domain, the characteristic aspects of the abuse of a dominant
position on the marketplace for businesses can be carried over to the marketplace
for constitutional ideas.
More specifically, the main players in the market for constitutional ideas are
obviously not businesses holding a dominant position but rather constitutional courts.
Due to its influence as well as the structure of the market itself, within this period of
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democratic regression that is affecting much of Europe (and indeed beyond), the
German Federal Constitutional Court is capable of influencing the argumentative
frameworks used by courts. This dynamic is a particularly sensitive one for those
courts that are increasingly losing independence and the ability to play a counter-
majoritarian role in limiting political power.
If this is the case, we may conclude that the German Federal Constitutional Court
occupies a dominant position on the European market for constitutional ideas.
Consequently, shifting the metaphor proposed here from the source domain
(antitrust) to the target domain (European constitutional law), we may conclude that
the Court is subject to a specific “special responsibility”.
German federal constitutional judges should, in my view, bear responsibility, in
particular, for avoiding the use of language that is liable foster national intolerance
and constitutional patriotism, a clear example being that used in the judgment of
5 May. This language can even be distorted by illiberal governments and packed
courts into theoretical justification for undermining the rule of law and enhancing the
strength of populist and undemocratic powers.
During the current pandemic, this is the most dangerous and contagious virus.
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